StrongRoom · Private briefing library

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This library holds the current briefing materials for provable election custody. It is shared privately with the people helping put it in place.

If you need access, ask the person who sent you this link. Nothing here is a certified voting system, and nothing here is binding on any election.
For the people who will run it

Let's build elections our children can check for themselves.

You are the reason this works. Clerks, directors, elections IT, security officers, poll workers, and partners — this library is written for you, not about you. Start with the 90-second welcome, then take whatever you need.

Start here

Under two minutes, in plain language: what this is, what it will never do, and how the plan protects your office while the evidence proves itself.

Welcome cut · 1 min 40

A welcome for the people who will run it

Narrated, 1080p. Good for a first meeting, a staff huddle, or an email to a colleague you want in the room.

The rest of the video library

Same story, three lengths and shapes. Use whichever fits the room you are in.

Full briefing · 4 minutes

The complete walkthrough

All eleven panels, narrated end to end: the gap in today's records, the four proof properties, the privacy wall, the role views, deployment posture, the pilot path, and the published limits. Built for a sit-down briefing with officials or counsel.

Vertical · captions burned in

For phones and quiet rooms

A 9×16 cut of the welcome with captions burned into the picture, so it reads with the sound off — on a phone, in a hallway, or dropped into a group chat with the people you want beside you on this.

Documents you can hand to someone

The implementation guide is the welcoming one — written for your team. The other two are for the people who will ask harder questions.

First page of the implementation guide
Implementation guide · 5 pages

Welcome — A Plan for Provable Elections

Written for the people who will run it. What changes day to day, what it will never do, how the proof works in plain language, what we ask of you and what you can expect from us, a simple way to begin, and where we are honest about the limits. Editable Word file, so your office can adapt it.

First page of the executive summary
Executive summary · 4 pages

Provable Custody for Elections

The written case, with the proof model and the privacy boundary explained in full. Send this ahead of a meeting with an elected official, a general counsel, or a security reviewer.

Cover slide of the briefing deck
Slide deck · 11 slides

Policymaker briefing deck

Caption-only slides, one idea each. Present it, or leave it behind on a desk. It is the same spine as the videos.

The plan we are following

Deliberately gentle, in this order, with a real gate between each step. Nothing about your count, your certification, or your authority changes.

One shadow environment

Custody evidence runs beside the systems you already use. No binding role, no system of record, nothing that touches results.

Your procedures lead

We fit the record to how your office actually works, and your team tells us where it helps and where it gets in the way.

Independent review

Outside cryptographic and legal review before anything expands. That review is a gate, not a formality.

Then, only then, growth

One environment proven end to end before a second one is ever discussed. Slow is the feature.

Where we are honest with you

A system whose whole value is honest evidence cannot afford to overstate itself. These limits are published rather than managed, and you will hear them from us before you hear them from anyone else.

Not federally certifiedNot EAC-certified under VVSG 2.0, and not offered as a system of record for a binding election.
Public proof runs use synthetic dataReal scan-event ingestion depends on authorized access to postal tracking data, which remains a near-term gate.
Independent review is still ahead of usOutside cryptographic and legal review has not been completed. Until it is, production use is not appropriate.
Guardian independence is not yet physicalThe current threshold-key setup can be simulated on shared infrastructure. Until guardians run on genuinely separate infrastructure, that control does not fully protect against the operator.
Residual risks are documentedColluding officers, guardian collusion, print-vendor token access, limited coercion resistance, and dependence on verifier implementations are all recorded in the threat model. Cryptography narrows institutional trust; it does not eliminate it.

Paper stays authoritative throughout. This system does not mark ballots, tabulate votes, report results, or decide voter eligibility, and it never decides whether a ballot is valid.